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This	  paper	  examines	  the	  developmental	  causes	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  shift	  from	  
a	  parliamentary	  to	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  system	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  in	  1978,	  examining	  its	  
provenance,	  rationale,	  and	  its	  unfolding	  trajectory.	  Drawing	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
sources,	  it	  sets	  out	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  executive	  presidency	  was	  born	  out	  of	  an	  
elite	  impulse	  to	  create	  a	  more	  stable,	  centralised	  political	  structure	  to	  resist	  the	  
welfarist	  electoral	  pressures	  that	  had	  taken	  hold	  in	  the	  post-­‐independence	  period,	  
and	  to	  pursue	  a	  market-­‐driven	  model	  of	  economic	  growth.	  This	  strategy	  succeeded	  
in	  its	  early	  years	  1978-­‐93,	  when	  presidents	  retained	  legislative	  control,	  maintained	  
a	  strong	  personal	  commitment	  to	  market	  reforms,	  and	  cultivated	  alternative	  
sources	  of	  legitimacy.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  these	  factors,	  the	  presidency	  slipped	  into	  
crisis	  over	  1994-­‐2004	  as	  resistance	  to	  elite-­‐led	  projects	  of	  state	  reform	  mounted	  
and	  as	  the	  president	  lost	  control	  of	  the	  legislature.	  Since	  2005	  the	  presidency	  has	  
regained	  its	  power,	  but	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  abandoning	  its	  original	  rationale	  and	  
function	  as	  a	  means	  to	  recalibrate	  the	  elite/mass	  power	  relationship	  to	  facilitate	  
elite-­‐led	  reform	  agendas.	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INTRODUCTION	  
How	  do	  political	  institutions	  affect	  economic	  development?	  Since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  theory	  and	  
practice	  of	  economic	  development	  has	  been	  transformed	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  ‘institutions	  matter’	  and	  
that	  economic	  outcomes	  are	  best	  explained	  by	  the	  institutional	  environments	  that	  beget	  them.	  
Consequently,	  a	  wide	  assortment	  of	  developmental	  pathologies	  have	  been	  traced	  back	  and	  
reframed	  as	  institutional	  problems,	  whether	  of	  poor	  design,	  weak	  enforcement,	  non-­‐transparency,	  
accountability,	  over-­‐centralisation,	  multiplicity,	  low	  capacity,	  weak	  legitimacy,	  or	  elite	  capture.	  The	  
promotion	  of	  economic	  development	  is	  as	  a	  result	  widely	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  engineering	  
and	  enhancing	  an	  optimal	  and	  functional	  institutional	  regime	  of	  political	  rules,	  with	  a	  concomitant	  
set	  of	  rewards	  and	  punishments.	  
	  
This	  paper	  contributes	  to	  that	  broad	  field	  of	  study	  by	  exploring	  the	  developmental	  causes	  and	  
consequences	  of	  a	  major	  institutional	  change	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Sri	  Lankan	  development	  history:	  the	  
shift	  from	  a	  parliamentary	  to	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  political	  system	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  powerful	  
executive	  presidency	  in	  1978.	  The	  semi-­‐presidential	  system	  was	  introduced	  as	  part	  of	  a	  new	  
constitution	  in	  1978,	  and	  was	  the	  most	  significant	  change	  to	  the	  country’s	  political	  architecture	  since	  
independence	  in	  1948.	  Moreover,	  there	  was	  a	  distinctly	  developmentalist	  rationale	  that	  inspired	  it,	  
and	  that	  it	  was	  brought	  into	  being	  to	  serve.	  
	  
The	  main	  difference	  between	  a	  presidential	  and	  parliamentary	  system	  of	  government	  is	  in	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  legislature.	  In	  parliamentary	  systems,	  the	  executive,	  
including	  the	  prime	  minister	  and	  the	  cabinet,	  is	  composed	  of	  sitting	  members	  of	  the	  legislature.	  In	  a	  
presidential	  system	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  executive	  is	  headed	  by	  a	  directly	  elected	  president,	  so	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  separation	  of	  powers	  between	  the	  executive	  and	  legislature.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  significant	  debate	  in	  the	  political	  science	  and	  economics	  literature	  on	  the	  relative	  merits	  of	  
presidential	  versus	  parliamentary	  systems	  for	  democratic	  resilience,	  government	  stability,	  and	  
effective	  policy-­‐making.1	  Persson	  and	  Tabellini	  suggest	  that	  ‘presidentialism	  could	  lead	  to	  overall	  
better	  policies	  in	  consolidated	  and	  solid	  democracies	  but	  not	  in	  more	  precarious	  democratic	  
situations’.2	  Cox	  and	  McCubbins	  argue	  that	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  in	  a	  presidential	  system	  makes	  
it	  less	  decisive	  in	  policy-­‐formulation,	  but	  resistant	  to	  reversal	  and	  thus	  more	  resolute	  in	  carrying	  it	  
forward	  through	  implementation.3	  Keefer	  instead	  argues	  that	  policy	  outcomes	  are	  only	  weakly	  
affected	  by	  constitutional	  choice.4	  
	  
At	  first	  glance,	  the	  switch	  from	  a	  parliamentary	  to	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  system	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  did	  bring	  
about	  evident	  changes	  to	  development	  policy.	  The	  Westminster-­‐style	  prime	  ministerial	  system	  of	  
1948-­‐77	  is	  widely	  characterised	  as	  a	  period	  when	  electoral	  populism	  led	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  
unsustainable	  welfare	  spending,	  excessive	  state	  intervention,	  and	  economic	  stagnation.	  In	  contrast,	  
the	  switch	  to	  the	  Gaullist	  semi-­‐presidential	  system	  in	  1978	  gave	  birth	  to	  a	  more	  authoritarian	  
politics,	  and	  to	  a	  new	  era	  of	  market	  reforms,	  economic	  dynamism,	  and	  global	  re-­‐integration.	  
	  
But	  a	  closer	  inspection	  of	  the	  actual	  processes	  involved	  would	  reveal	  a	  far	  more	  challenging	  and	  
complicated	  reality.	  Economic	  growth	  did	  increase	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  
executive	  presidency,	  but	  often	  in	  unexpected	  and	  counter-­‐intuitive	  ways	  that	  were	  only	  indirectly	  
connected	  to	  the	  new	  institutional	  system.	  The	  rapid	  growth	  and	  structural	  transformations	  that	  
were	  evident	  through	  market	  reform-­‐led	  growth	  in	  the	  south	  also	  occurred	  in	  parallel	  with	  the	  
escalating	  civil	  war	  in	  the	  north-­‐east,	  generating	  a	  schizophrenic	  mix	  of	  development	  amidst	  
destruction.	  The	  market	  reform	  programme	  was	  itself	  no	  textbook	  shift	  from	  state	  to	  market:	  it	  was	  
accompanied	  by	  a	  massive	  expansion	  of	  the	  state,	  first	  through	  large	  rural	  development	  schemes,	  
and	  later	  through	  the	  fiscal	  impact	  of	  the	  expanding	  defence	  budget,	  each	  of	  which	  created	  knock-­‐
on	  effects	  within	  and	  beyond	  the	  economic	  sphere.	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In	  other	  words,	  the	  superficial	  correlation	  between	  the	  presidential	  system	  and	  higher	  economic	  
development	  provides	  an	  incomplete,	  if	  not	  entirely	  misleading	  answer,	  and	  leaves	  the	  most	  
important	  questions	  un-­‐addressed.	  More	  broadly,	  the	  study	  of	  political	  institutions	  and	  economic	  
development	  struggles	  to	  address	  three	  key	  methodological	  problems.	  Firstly,	  there	  is	  the	  challenge	  
of	  endogeneity,	  and	  understanding	  how	  to	  uncouple	  cause	  and	  effect:	  do	  institutions	  lead	  to	  
development	  or	  is	  it	  vice	  versa?	  Secondly,	  while	  correlations	  abound,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  better	  
understand	  the	  actual	  processes	  and	  causal	  sequences	  that	  connect	  institutional	  change	  to	  
economic	  development.	  Thirdly,	  the	  same	  institutions,	  even	  in	  the	  same	  country,	  can	  produce	  very	  
divergent	  outcomes	  over	  time,	  suggesting	  that	  there	  are	  missing	  variables	  that	  need	  to	  be	  identified.	  
	  
This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  address	  some	  of	  these	  prevailing	  challenges	  by	  taking	  a	  more	  actor-­‐centric	  
perspective	  of	  how	  institutional	  reform	  is	  rationalised,	  and	  then	  evaluates	  its	  outcome	  under	  that	  
framework	  and	  set	  of	  criteria.	  That	  is,	  institutional	  change	  and	  the	  economic	  consequences	  that	  
result	  are	  not	  cast	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  a	  causal	  relationship	  to	  isolate	  and	  test	  in	  itself,	  but	  as	  a	  
political	  project	  to	  be	  approached	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  historically	  informed	  political	  sociology.	  
This	  involves	  tracing	  the	  origins	  and	  rationale	  of	  the	  executive	  presidency	  in	  Sri	  Lanka,	  identifying	  its	  
social	  constituency	  of	  support,	  and	  then	  explaining	  how	  this	  project	  unfolded	  in	  practice,	  and	  with	  
what	  consequences.	  	  
	  
In	  analytical	  terms,	  this	  is	  mapped	  out	  across	  the	  terrain	  of	  the	  broader	  relationship	  between	  
democracy	  and	  development	  in	  Sri	  Lanka,	  and	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  the	  ‘elite/mass	  
discontinuity’,	  which	  James	  Manor	  described	  as	  the	  ‘principal	  political	  cleavage	  in	  the	  polity	  of	  Sri	  
Lanka’5.	  This	  paper	  takes	  Manor’s	  typology	  (written	  incidentally	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  
1978	  constitution)	  as	  the	  point	  of	  departure	  to	  view	  how	  elites	  and	  masses,	  particularly	  with	  
reference	  to	  the	  Sinhala-­‐Buddhist	  majority,	  positioned	  themselves	  on	  opposite	  sides	  of	  the	  main	  
issues	  of	  political	  contention	  with	  respect	  to	  economic	  policy	  and	  also	  to	  the	  ethnic	  conflict.	  	  
	  
The	  empirical	  basis	  for	  this	  paper	  is	  eclectic	  and	  diverse,	  and	  includes	  both	  primary	  and	  secondary	  
evidence	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  sources	  to	  advance,	  illustrate,	  and	  substantiate	  the	  narrative.	  In	  
addition,	  it	  draws	  on	  an	  accumulated	  body	  of	  original	  research	  and	  fieldwork	  conducted	  by	  the	  
author	  on	  Sri	  Lankan	  politics	  and	  the	  economy	  from	  2004-­‐2012,	  based	  on	  interviews,	  documentary	  
evidence,	  archival	  research	  and	  statistical	  data.	  
	  
In	  brief,	  modern	  Sri	  Lankan	  constitutional	  history	  has	  four	  distinct	  periods:	  the	  Donoughmore	  
constitution	  of	  1931-­‐47	  that	  introduced	  universal	  franchise	  and	  a	  significant	  measure	  of	  self-­‐
government;	  the	  Soulbury	  constitution	  1948-­‐71,	  which	  created	  a	  Westminster	  style	  parliamentary	  
system	  under	  dominion	  status	  at	  independence;	  the	  Republican	  constitution	  of	  1971-­‐77,	  which	  
largely	  continued	  the	  basic	  domestic	  political	  architecture	  of	  Soulbury,	  but	  which	  ended	  dominion	  
status;	  the	  1978	  Gaullist	  constitution	  which	  introduced	  an	  executive	  president	  and	  proportional	  
representation-­‐based	  voting	  for	  the	  legislature.	  	  
	  
The	  academic	  literature	  on	  development	  as	  well	  as	  the	  guiding	  wisdom	  during	  the	  colonial	  period	  
was	  that	  development	  has	  to	  precede	  democracy:	  stable	  democracies	  are	  only	  tenable	  at	  later	  
stages	  of	  development	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  income	  and	  education.	  This	  is	  the	  thrust	  not	  only	  of	  
Seymour	  Lipsett’s	  classic	  work	  on	  the	  subject6,	  but	  also	  of	  Adam	  Przeworski,	  who	  comes	  to	  the	  same	  
conclusion	  from	  an	  opposite	  direction	  of	  causality.	  Whereas	  Lipsett	  essentially	  argues	  that	  the	  poor	  
are	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  democracy	  and	  vulnerable	  to	  demagogic	  extremists,	  Przeworski	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  the	  
rich	  who	  will	  find	  democracy	  intolerable	  because	  of	  the	  threat	  it	  poses	  to	  their	  wealth7.	  Indeed,	  
Przeworski,	  et	  al	  attach	  a	  statistical	  probability	  of	  0.12	  for	  democratic	  survival	  in	  a	  poor	  country	  with	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per	  capita	  income	  of	  less	  than	  $1000	  –	  implying	  that	  the	  expected	  lifetime	  of	  a	  poor	  democracy	  is	  
8.5	  years.8	  
	  
As	  such,	  theory	  holds	  that	  premature	  democratization	  in	  poor,	  under-­‐developed	  countries,	  such	  as	  
late-­‐colonial	  Ceylon	  would	  cause	  either	  democracy	  or	  development	  to	  suffer.	  Such	  countries	  would	  
either	  revert	  to	  non-­‐democratic	  authoritarian	  regimes	  (in	  form	  if	  not	  in	  substance),	  or	  else	  suffer	  
extended	  periods	  of	  retarded	  and	  distorted	  development.	  Or	  else,	  they	  could	  chaotically	  zig-­‐zag	  
through	  a	  half-­‐way	  system	  where	  weak	  democratic	  institutions	  and	  weak	  developmental	  outcomes	  
reproduce	  one	  another.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  experience	  of	  successful	  late-­‐developing	  countries	  in	  East	  
Asia	  such	  as	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  is	  illustrative:	  both	  remained	  under	  authoritarian	  regimes	  
during	  the	  period	  of	  their	  industrialisation,	  and	  did	  not	  democratize	  until	  the	  1980s,	  by	  which	  time	  
they	  had	  already	  achieved	  a	  substantial	  measure	  of	  prosperity.	  
	  
This	  long-­‐standing	  view	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  economic	  development	  and	  democracy	  has	  
endured	  an	  onslaught	  of	  critique	  and	  challenge	  from	  alternative	  theories.9	  Nevertheless,	  it	  remains	  
significant	  not	  because	  of	  it	  has	  greater	  explanatory	  power	  or	  empirical	  validity	  as	  such,	  but	  because	  
it	  has	  wide	  currency	  and	  influence	  on	  the	  ground.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  has	  relevance	  not	  just	  for	  its	  
analytical	  content	  but	  because	  it	  is	  insinuated	  in	  the	  attitudes	  and	  expectations	  of	  many	  of	  the	  
actors	  under	  study.	  	  
	  
The	  argument	  in	  brief	  is	  that	  Sri	  Lanka’s	  executive	  presidency	  was	  born	  out	  of	  an	  elite	  impulse	  to	  
create	  a	  more	  stable,	  centralised	  and	  authoritarian	  political	  structure	  that	  would	  overcome	  and	  
reverse	  the	  negative	  economic	  effects	  of	  a	  populist	  electoral	  democracy.	  It	  would	  they	  hoped,	  help	  
revive	  economic	  growth	  under	  a	  market-­‐driven	  development	  regime.	  This	  project	  succeeded	  (on	  its	  
own	  terms)	  in	  its	  early	  years,	  when	  the	  presidencies	  of	  J.R.	  Jayewardene	  (1978-­‐88)	  and	  Ranasinghe	  
Premadasa	  (1989-­‐93)	  retained	  legislative	  control	  and	  maintained	  a	  strong	  personal	  commitment	  to	  
market	  reforms.	  It	  later	  struggled	  and	  went	  into	  crisis	  under	  the	  Chandrika	  Kumaratunga	  presidency	  
(1995-­‐2005)	  as	  resistance	  mounted	  from	  above	  and	  below.	  The	  presidency	  itself	  was	  rescued	  from	  
crisis	  by	  the	  Mahinda	  Rajapakse	  presidency	  (2005-­‐2014),	  but	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  rejecting	  the	  project	  and	  
rationale	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  it	  and	  by	  embracing	  the	  electoral	  populism	  that	  it	  was	  created	  to	  resist.	  	  
	  
	  
TASTING	  THE	  FRUIT	  BEFORE	  PLANTING	  THE	  TREE:	  1948-­‐77	  
The	  internal	  debate	  on	  democracy	  and	  development	  needs	  to	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  colonial	  
government	  reforms	  of	  the	  late-­‐1920s,	  and	  the	  hearings	  of	  the	  Donoughmore	  Commission	  that	  was	  
entrusted	  with	  making	  recommendations	  for	  a	  new	  constitution.	  Political	  reforms	  had	  since	  the	  
1880s	  gradually	  expanded	  the	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  native	  representation	  within	  the	  colonial	  
government,	  and	  the	  nascent	  Ceylonese	  elite	  that	  had	  been	  thus	  drawn	  in	  expected	  and	  lobbied	  for	  
further	  such	  gradual	  reforms.	  However,	  the	  Donoughmore	  Commission,	  which	  arrived	  in	  Ceylon	  in	  
1927	  had	  more	  ambitious	  ideas	  in	  mind.	  They	  proposed	  a	  significant	  expansion	  in	  self-­‐government,	  
but	  linked	  this	  to	  an	  even	  more	  significant	  expansion	  of	  the	  franchise.	  Voting	  had	  hitherto	  been	  
restricted	  to	  men	  of	  education	  and	  property,	  but	  the	  Donoughmore	  Commissioners	  proposed	  
extending	  it	  all	  men	  and	  women	  aged	  21	  and	  over.	  
	  
Ceylon’s	  native	  political	  elite,	  composed	  entirely	  of	  wealthy,	  educated,	  westernised	  men,	  were	  
aghast	  at	  the	  idea	  of	  such	  a	  radical	  reform.	  Almost	  unanimously,	  they	  opposed	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  
vote	  to	  those	  they	  considered	  manifestly	  unsuited	  and	  unprepared	  for	  it.10	  Their	  most	  senior	  and	  
respected	  personality,	  Sir	  Ponnambalam	  Ramanathan,	  wrote	  in	  outrage	  that	  it	  was	  ‘an	  utter	  
stupidity’	  to	  ‘transfer	  political	  power	  to	  a	  dangerous	  mob’.11	  Yet	  it	  went	  ahead.	  Under	  the	  
Donoughmore	  constitution	  (1931-­‐47),	  the	  crown	  colony	  of	  Ceylon	  –	  not	  even	  a	  dominion	  yet	  –	  was	  
the	  first	  country	  in	  Asia,	  and	  the	  first	  ‘non-­‐white’	  part	  of	  the	  empire	  to	  be	  granted	  such	  extensive	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self-­‐government,	  and	  also	  the	  first	  to	  have	  universal	  suffrage.	  Ceylon’s	  first	  such	  election	  in	  1931	  
took	  place	  a	  full	  two	  decades	  before	  it	  would	  happen	  in	  India.	  	  
	  
The	  political	  enfranchisement	  of	  the	  entire	  adult	  population	  quickly	  changed	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  
competition	  and	  the	  incentives	  that	  guided	  the	  behaviour	  of	  elites.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1940s,	  the	  
government	  had	  initiated	  a	  range	  of	  transformative	  social	  welfare	  schemes	  such	  as	  subsidized	  food,	  
free	  education,	  and	  free	  public	  health,	  which	  changed	  life	  for	  the	  better	  for	  the	  large	  majority	  that	  
had	  hitherto	  been	  deprived	  of	  these.12	  As	  a	  result,	  by	  the	  early	  1960s,	  Sri	  Lanka	  was	  being	  described	  
as	  an	  unusual	  and	  precocious	  development	  miracle.	  Between	  1946-­‐63,	  the	  infant	  morality	  rate	  
dropped	  from	  141	  per	  1,000	  to	  56	  per	  1,000	  while	  life	  expectancy	  increased	  from	  43	  to	  63	  years.	  The	  
adult	  literacy	  rate,	  which	  was	  already	  comparatively	  high	  in	  1946	  at	  58	  percent	  rose	  quickly	  to	  72	  
percent	  by	  1963.	  These	  improvements	  also	  occurred	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  anything	  near	  a	  
commensurate	  increase	  in	  economic	  growth,	  so	  that	  Sri	  Lanka	  had,	  in	  terms	  of	  social	  welfare	  
indicators,	  burst	  into	  the	  league	  of	  countries	  that	  were	  a	  factor	  of	  between	  five	  and	  ten	  times	  
wealthier	  in	  terms	  of	  income.13	  	  
	  
These	  historic	  gains	  notwithstanding,	  it	  is	  also	  not	  possible	  to	  ignore	  the	  many	  negative	  features	  that	  
were	  also	  intrinsic	  to	  this	  process,	  and	  which	  would	  vindicate	  the	  apprehensions,	  however	  
condescending	  they	  seem	  in	  retrospect,	  of	  the	  Donoughmore	  era	  elites.	  Universal	  suffrage	  granted	  
abruptly	  to	  an	  impoverished	  rural	  population	  who	  had	  never	  actually	  asked	  for	  it	  was	  quickly	  
exploited	  and	  captured;	  first	  by	  dominant	  social	  groups	  and	  later	  by	  the	  kind	  of	  ‘extremist	  
demagogues’	  that	  Lipsett	  explicitly	  warned	  of.	  Electoral	  competition	  fuelled	  and	  channelled	  a	  
growing	  tide	  of	  ethno-­‐nationalism	  in	  the	  Sinhalese	  and	  Tamil	  communities	  into	  frontal	  political	  
confrontation	  that	  eventually	  escalated	  into	  civil	  war.	  The	  ‘ethnic	  fratricide’	  that	  Stanley	  Tambiah	  
wrote	  of	  evocatively	  after	  the	  1983	  riots14	  did	  not	  result	  from	  the	  ‘dismantling	  of	  democracy’	  at	  all,	  
but	  was	  more	  likely	  as	  Jonathan	  Spencer	  describes,	  one	  of	  its	  illiberal	  consequences.15	  	  	  
	  
Electoral	  politics	  also	  created	  incentives	  for	  political	  aspirants	  to	  hand	  out	  generous	  public	  welfare	  
schemes	  that	  taxed	  the	  productive	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy	  to	  fund	  not	  investments,	  but	  
unproductive	  consumption	  subsidies.	  Joan	  Robinson,	  the	  Cambridge	  economist	  famously	  remarked	  
that	  ‘Ceylon	  has	  tasted	  the	  fruit	  before	  she	  has	  planted	  the	  tree’.16	  Emblematic	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  
political	  dysfunctionality	  of	  the	  time	  was	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  rice	  subsidy,	  and	  its	  quick	  elevation	  to	  
the	  status	  of	  a	  political	  ‘holy	  cow’.	  Introduced	  initially	  as	  a	  war-­‐time	  measure,	  the	  subsidy	  grew	  to	  
occupy	  20	  percent	  of	  all	  government	  expenditures	  and	  became	  electorally	  impossible	  to	  withdraw,	  
even	  when	  the	  government	  was	  in	  fiscal	  distress.	  	  
	  
Indeed	  electoral	  politics	  under	  universal	  franchise	  was	  creating	  a	  super-­‐heated	  political	  environment	  
that	  had	  by	  the	  1950s,	  upturned	  the	  dull	  and	  docile	  elite	  politics	  of	  the	  colonial	  era.	  With	  the	  general	  
strike,	  or	  ‘hartal’	  of	  1953,	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  ethnically	  divisive	  Sinhala-­‐only	  language	  act	  of	  1956;	  
the	  assassination	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  by	  a	  monk	  in	  1959	  and	  island-­‐wide	  ethnic	  riots	  in	  1958,	  the	  
democratic	  dystopia	  of	  mob	  rule	  predicted	  by	  the	  Donoughmore	  era	  elite	  appeared	  to	  have	  come	  
true.	  Even	  though	  many	  surviving	  members	  of	  that	  native	  elite	  were	  actually	  at	  the	  helm,	  and	  were	  
themselves	  deeply	  complicit	  in	  presiding	  over	  and	  politically	  profiting	  from	  these	  tumultuous	  events,	  
they	  nevertheless	  viewed	  the	  unfolding	  political	  and	  economic	  chaos	  with	  evident	  concern	  and	  
distaste.	  	  
	  
One	  manifestation	  of	  the	  depth	  of	  desperation	  that	  had	  set	  into	  the	  ancien	  regime	  about	  the	  need	  
to	  correct	  course	  and	  redress	  the	  excesses	  of	  electoral	  democracy	  was	  a	  failed	  coup	  d’êtat	  in	  1962.	  
The	  main	  protagonists	  in	  this	  ‘colonels’	  coup’	  were	  a	  group	  of	  senior	  (but	  second	  echelon)	  military	  
and	  police	  officers	  whose	  educational,	  social,	  and	  religious	  background	  (they	  were	  for	  example,	  
almost	  entirely	  Christian)	  and	  family	  connections	  linked	  them	  closely	  to	  the	  erstwhile	  colonial-­‐era	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social	  and	  economic	  elite.	  David	  Horowitz’s	  study	  into	  the	  coup,	  based	  on	  an	  extensive	  set	  of	  
interviews	  with	  the	  conspirators,	  clustered	  the	  reasons	  that	  motivated	  it	  around	  a	  familiar	  set	  of	  
complaints	  by	  the	  members	  of	  that	  social	  stratum.	  These	  included	  ‘unrest,	  strikes,	  no	  discipline’,	  
‘danger	  from	  the	  left’,	  and	  ‘politicians	  pandering	  to	  the	  mob’.17	  
	  
It	  emerged	  only	  much	  later	  that	  three	  of	  the	  senior-­‐most	  members	  of	  that	  very	  elite:	  the	  former	  
prime	  minister,	  Sir	  John	  Kotelawala,	  the	  opposition	  leader	  Dudley	  Senanayake,	  and	  the	  president,	  Sir	  
Oliver	  Goonetileke,	  were	  complicit	  in	  the	  plot,	  and	  were	  to	  have	  stepped	  forward	  to	  assume	  control	  
and	  re-­‐constitute	  a	  new	  executive	  after	  the	  putsch.	  Fatefully	  for	  the	  subsequent	  history	  of	  
democracy	  in	  Sri	  Lanka,	  not	  only	  was	  the	  conspiracy	  uncovered	  and	  stopped	  at	  the	  eleventh	  hour,	  
but	  the	  role	  that	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  opposition	  Dudley	  Senanayake,	  played	  in	  it	  was	  never	  fully	  
uncovered	  until	  after	  his	  death	  in	  1973,	  by	  which	  time	  he	  had	  been	  re-­‐elected	  and	  had	  gone	  on	  to	  
serve	  another	  full	  term	  as	  prime	  minister.18	  
	  
The	  other,	  far	  more	  successfully	  executed	  plan,	  emanating	  from	  largely	  the	  same	  impulse,	  and	  from	  
a	  leading	  politician	  of	  the	  same	  opposition	  party	  and	  vintage,	  was	  the	  Gaullist	  semi-­‐presidential	  
system.	  Conceived,	  nurtured,	  and	  introduced	  almost	  single-­‐handedly	  by	  J.R.	  Jayewardene,	  the	  
broader,	  unspoken	  compulsion	  that	  guided	  the	  executive	  presidency	  was,	  as	  with	  the	  coup	  d’êtat,	  
one	  of	  protecting	  political	  decision-­‐making	  from	  the	  heat	  of	  electoral	  pressures.	  As	  Horowitz	  
describes,	  ‘Its	  principal	  purpose	  was	  to	  create	  a	  political	  executive	  with	  a	  fixed	  term	  that	  would	  
permit	  the	  incumbent	  to	  make	  unpopular	  decisions’.19	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Jayewardene	  and	  his	  party	  
colleagues,	  the	  clear	  objective	  was	  to	  turn	  the	  clock	  back	  to	  the	  golden	  age	  of	  political,	  economic,	  
and	  inter-­‐ethnic	  stability	  of	  the	  early	  post-­‐independence	  years	  when	  they	  were	  in	  power.	  	  
	  
This	  is	  of	  course	  an	  opportunistic	  misreading	  of	  that	  period,	  and	  belies	  the	  fact	  that	  as	  the	  first	  
finance	  minister	  of	  independent	  Ceylon	  from	  1947-­‐51,	  J.R.	  Jayewardene’s	  budgets	  -­‐	  viewed	  at	  the	  
time	  as	  a	  bold	  Keynesian	  departure	  from	  the	  stifling	  liberal	  orthodoxy	  of	  the	  colonial-­‐era	  –	  were	  a	  
precursor	  of	  much	  of	  what	  was	  to	  come	  later.	  The	  taxation	  of	  the	  plantation	  sector	  to	  fund	  
consumer	  subsidies,	  welfare	  expansion,	  and	  even	  some	  measure	  of	  planning	  and	  import-­‐
substitution	  industrialisation	  were	  all	  projects	  advanced	  (albeit	  in	  a	  more	  cautious	  manner)	  by	  the	  
very	  person	  who	  would,	  three	  decades	  later,	  seek	  to	  dismantle	  them,	  and	  to	  force	  that	  genie	  back	  
into	  its	  bottle.	  
	  
The	  historical	  source	  material	  on	  the	  provenance	  of	  the	  executive	  presidency	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  is	  
surprisingly	  sparse.	  There	  was	  by	  all	  accounts,	  no	  long-­‐standing	  debate	  on	  the	  issue	  within	  
Jayewardene’s	  United	  National	  Party	  (UNP),	  or	  even	  among	  the	  broader	  political,	  journalistic,	  or	  
intellectual	  milieu.	  It	  appears	  instead	  that	  the	  idea	  belonged	  to	  Jayewardene	  himself,	  and	  was	  
announced	  publicly	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  a	  speech	  that	  he	  made	  in	  1966.20	  In	  its	  form,	  it	  was	  clearly	  
inspired	  by	  the	  ‘semi-­‐presidential’	  or	  ‘premier-­‐presidential’	  system	  of	  the	  French	  fifth	  republic,	  and	  
the	  way	  that	  it	  appeared	  to	  correct	  the	  deep	  imbalances	  wrought	  by	  the	  Westminster	  system.	  	  
	  
The	  separation	  of	  the	  executive	  from	  the	  legislature	  ensured	  that	  the	  chief	  executive	  would	  stand	  
above	  the	  petty	  bickering	  and	  fickle	  alliances	  of	  parliament.	  The	  fixed	  time-­‐line	  for	  a	  presidential	  
term	  ensured	  that	  policies	  could	  be	  formulated	  with	  a	  longer,	  more	  dependable	  time-­‐line	  for	  their	  
implementation,	  and	  be	  free	  of	  the	  imminent	  threat	  of	  a	  loss	  of	  confidence	  and	  collapse	  of	  the	  
executive.	  One	  additional	  important	  change	  wrought	  by	  the	  1978	  constitution	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  
executive	  presidency	  was	  the	  switch	  from	  a	  first-­‐past-­‐the-­‐post	  constituency	  based	  legislature	  to	  one	  
based	  on	  multi-­‐member	  constituencies	  elected	  through	  a	  proportional	  representation	  system.	  This	  
was	  to	  address	  the	  unfairness	  of	  the	  massive,	  undeserved	  parliamentary	  majorities	  that	  the	  plurality	  
voting	  system	  had	  produced	  in	  1956,	  1960	  (July)	  and	  1970	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  UNP.	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In	  substance	  though,	  the	  idea	  of	  concentrating	  centralized	  powers	  in	  the	  person	  of	  the	  executive	  
president	  responded	  directly	  to	  the	  compulsion	  to	  contain	  the	  excesses	  of	  electoral	  democracy.	  As	  
Jeyaratnam	  Wilson,	  a	  close	  confidant	  of	  Jayewardene	  who	  played	  an	  influential	  role	  in	  framing	  the	  
1978	  constitution	  describes,	  the	  problem	  was	  that	  ‘the	  major	  contenders	  were	  merely	  auctioning	  
away	  the	  limited	  assets	  of	  a	  society	  which	  was	  traversing	  the	  road	  to	  economic	  ruin’.21	  Urmila	  
Phadnis	  describes	  how:	  
	  
The	  changeover	  from	  the	  Westminster	  model	  of	  a	  parliamentary	  system	  to	  a	  de	  Gaullist	  type	  of	  
presidential	  system	  was	  justified	  on	  the	  ground	  that,	  for	  the	  acceleration	  of	  economic	  development	  
as	  envisaged	  by	  the	  new	  regime,	  a	  strong	  and	  stable	  government	  was	  required.22	  	  
	  
The	  imperatives	  that	  guided	  the	  newly	  empowered	  presidency	  corresponded	  with	  Jayewardene’s	  
admiration	  of	  the	  developmental	  results	  achieved	  by	  his	  more	  authoritarian	  contemporaries	  
elsewhere	  in	  Asia.	  It	  also	  bears	  mention	  that	  the	  brewing	  crisis	  of	  governability	  that	  afflicted	  many	  
Westminster-­‐style	  systems	  during	  the	  1960s-­‐70s	  had	  led	  to	  a	  growing	  admiration	  of	  the	  presidential	  
system	  by	  political	  elites	  across	  the	  former	  British	  empire,	  and	  its	  adoption	  by	  countries	  such	  as	  
Nigeria,	  Ghana,	  and	  Uganda.	  
	  
That	  said,	  despite	  the	  measure	  of	  international	  inspiration	  involved,	  the	  simultaneous	  adoption	  of	  a	  
radically	  different	  political	  system	  and	  a	  new	  economic	  development	  regime	  was	  an	  original	  
experiment	  in	  its	  own	  right	  and	  not	  the	  prevailing	  international	  fashion.	  Market	  reforms	  were	  also	  
not	  forced	  on	  Jayewardene	  by	  the	  IMF	  at	  the	  knife-­‐edge	  of	  a	  balance	  of	  payments	  or	  debt	  crisis	  
bailout.	  Indeed	  Sri	  Lanka	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  countries	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  to	  implement	  such	  a	  
radical	  change	  of	  course,	  five	  to	  ten	  years	  before	  the	  rest	  of	  Asia,	  Africa,	  and	  Latin	  America	  would	  do	  
so	  far	  more	  grudgingly.	  	  
	  
	  
“LET	  THE	  ROBBER	  BARONS	  COME”:	  1977-­‐94	  
In	  the	  first	  two	  years	  of	  the	  reforms,	  the	  new	  UNP	  government	  deregulated	  with	  speed	  and	  gusto.	  It	  
liberalised	  foreign	  trade,	  removing	  import	  controls,	  reducing	  export	  duties,	  and	  devaluing	  the	  
exchange	  rate.	  It	  eliminated	  subsidies	  on	  food	  and	  petrol	  and	  liberalised	  internal	  agricultural	  
markets.	  It	  encouraged	  foreign	  investment,	  established	  export	  processing	  zones,	  modified	  labour	  
legislation,	  and	  deregulated	  credit	  markets.	  Foreign	  investment,	  which	  was	  practically	  zero	  for	  most	  
of	  the	  1970s,	  picked	  up	  to	  the	  level	  of	  US$50	  million	  a	  year	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.23	  	  
	  
This	  was	  the	  period	  in	  which	  the	  century	  old	  reliance	  on	  agricultural	  commodity	  exports	  as	  the	  
bedrock	  of	  government	  finances	  and	  foreign	  exchange	  earnings	  was	  finally	  overcome,	  and	  was	  
displaced	  by	  the	  new	  economy	  of	  tourism,	  garment	  manufacturing,	  and	  financial	  services.	  Between	  
1977-­‐86,	  the	  share	  of	  exports	  from	  agricultural	  commodities	  (primarily	  tea	  and	  rubber)	  dropped	  
from	  70	  percent	  to	  40	  percent,	  while	  industrial	  goods	  (primarily	  garments)	  went	  up	  from	  8	  percent	  
to	  40	  percent.	  The	  garment	  industry	  continued	  to	  expand	  steadily,	  aided	  by	  the	  unveiling	  of	  new	  
export-­‐processing	  zones,	  and	  had	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  accounted	  for	  half	  of	  all	  exports	  as	  tea	  was	  
reduced	  to	  one-­‐fifth.24	  
	   	  
As	  a	  result,	  Sri	  Lanka	  witnessed	  a	  surge	  in	  foreign	  trade	  and	  private-­‐sector	  led	  growth	  after	  1978	  that	  
fundamentally	  transformed	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  island	  economy	  and	  government	  finances.	  There	  
was	  also	  a	  noticeable	  increase	  in	  economic	  inequality	  in	  this	  period	  that	  continued	  to	  grow	  well	  into	  
the	  1990s.	  As	  Osmani	  describes,	  ‘there	  is	  clear	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  post	  reform	  growth	  has	  
been	  of	  an	  exceedingly	  unequalizing	  kind’.25	  Much	  has	  been	  written	  about	  Sri	  Lanka’s	  market	  
reforms,	  not	  just	  domestically	  but	  internationally,	  where	  it	  became	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  heated	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controversy	  between	  the	  advocates	  and	  critics	  of	  market	  reform	  and	  its	  role	  in	  growth	  versus	  
poverty.26	  
	  
The	  record	  would	  thus	  suggest	  that	  the	  new	  political	  system	  had	  succeeded	  in	  pulling	  Sri	  Lanka	  back	  
from	  the	  precipice	  of	  economic	  collapse;	  and	  that	  a	  judicious	  recalibration	  towards	  a	  more	  resolute	  
policy-­‐making	  structure	  was	  needed	  to	  introduce	  a	  more	  rational	  economic	  regime,	  albeit	  at	  the	  
transitional	  cost	  of	  higher	  inequality.	  In	  other	  words,	  ‘command	  politics’	  was	  needed	  to	  bring	  the	  
‘command	  economy’	  to	  an	  end.	  There	  is	  however,	  much	  that	  is	  missing	  from	  this	  story	  without	  
which	  it	  lacks	  not	  just	  colour	  and	  texture	  but	  many	  of	  its	  essential	  facets.	  Although	  the	  UNP’s	  
intention	  may	  well	  have	  been	  to	  engineer	  a	  more	  authoritarian,	  electorally	  insulated	  policy-­‐making	  
structure	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  a	  technocratic	  agenda	  of	  market	  deregulation,	  there	  were	  other	  aspects	  
that	  came	  along	  with	  it	  that	  limited,	  moderated	  and	  even	  reversed	  the	  concentration	  of	  power	  at	  
the	  apex.	  
	  
The	  high-­‐tide	  of	  authoritarianism	  that	  Jayewardene	  personified	  in	  the	  1980s	  came	  about	  not	  just	  
because	  the	  executive	  presidency	  provided	  him	  with	  many	  powers,	  but	  because	  this	  was	  buttressed	  
by	  overwhelming	  legislative	  support.	  Throughout	  his	  term	  in	  power	  (1977-­‐88),	  Jayewardene	  had	  a	  
parliamentary	  super-­‐majority	  (140	  of	  168	  seats)	  inherited	  as	  a	  relic	  of	  the	  previous	  constitution	  and	  
its	  first-­‐past-­‐the-­‐post	  system.	  No	  such	  majority	  would	  be	  possible	  again	  under	  the	  new	  proportional	  
representation	  rules.	  Nevertheless,	  by	  preserving	  the	  1977	  parliament,	  and	  by	  controversially	  
extending	  its	  life	  through	  to	  a	  second,	  unelected	  term	  until	  1989,	  Jayewardene	  afforded	  himself	  an	  
unprecedented	  measure	  of	  power	  over	  an	  exceptionally	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  In	  his	  ten	  years	  as	  
president,	  Jayewardene	  had	  the	  luxury	  of	  passing	  fourteen	  constitutional	  amendments,	  each	  of	  
which	  required	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  legislative	  majority.	  His	  successor	  Ranasinghe	  Premadasa	  would	  also	  
pass	  another	  two	  amendments	  in	  the	  dying	  days	  of	  that	  extraordinarily	  elongated	  parliament	  in	  
December	  1988.	  	  
	  
Proportional	  representation	  would,	  once	  inaugurated	  in	  1989,	  change	  the	  structure	  of	  legislative	  
representation	  entirely,	  and	  produce	  deeply	  fragmented	  parliaments	  out	  of	  which	  fragile	  multi-­‐party	  
ruling	  coalitions	  would	  be	  strung	  together.	  This	  not	  only	  improved	  the	  representative	  quality	  of	  
parliament	  in	  several	  dimensions,	  but	  it	  also	  served	  to	  constrain	  the	  powers	  that	  subsequent	  
presidents	  after	  Jayewardene	  wielded,	  requiring	  them	  to	  share	  power	  and	  make	  deep	  compromises	  
with	  many	  smaller	  coalition	  partners.	  Unlike	  the	  presidency,	  the	  legislature	  had	  no	  fixed	  term	  limit,	  
remaining	  vulnerable	  to	  sudden	  collapse	  and	  electoral	  recall,	  and	  therefore,	  far	  more	  responsive	  to	  
the	  popular	  pulse	  and	  to	  its	  murmurings	  of	  discontent.	  In	  time,	  this	  element	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  
deceleration	  of	  the	  pace	  of	  market	  reforms	  after	  Premadasa,	  and	  eventually,	  to	  its	  complete	  
suspension	  under	  Rajapakse.	  One	  simple	  indicator	  of	  the	  changing	  power	  of	  the	  presidency	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
the	  legislature	  is	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  constitutional	  amendments	  that	  have	  been	  passed.	  Between	  1978-­‐88,	  
constitutional	  amendments	  happened	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  about	  1.5	  per	  year.	  In	  the	  25	  year	  period	  1988-­‐
2013	  after	  that,	  the	  rate	  dropped	  to	  about	  0.1	  per	  year.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  story	  of	  market	  reforms	  in	  Sri	  Lanka,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  the	  
involvement	  of	  a	  much	  larger	  and	  more	  complex	  set	  of	  actors	  than	  is	  immediately	  apparent,	  as	  well	  
as	  an	  extraordinary	  array	  of	  political	  and	  ideological	  mechanics	  and	  theatrics.	  Having	  traumatically	  
lost	  power	  to	  a	  wave	  of	  economic	  and	  ethno-­‐nationalist	  populism	  in	  1956,	  the	  UNP	  had,	  since	  then,	  
consciously	  sought	  to	  repair	  its	  inherited	  identity	  as	  an	  unelectable	  party	  of	  rich	  urban	  
cosmopolitans.	  As	  Jayewardene	  himself	  put	  it,	  the	  task	  was	  to	  ‘correct	  the	  image	  of	  the	  UNP	  which	  
was	  considered	  a	  conservative,	  capitalist	  party’,27	  and	  he	  largely	  succeeded	  in	  this	  historical	  mission,	  
at	  least	  for	  a	  while.28	  In	  order	  to	  get	  the	  UNP	  re-­‐elected	  and	  to	  implement	  a	  counter-­‐populist	  
economic	  agenda	  of	  market	  liberalization	  and	  the	  de-­‐welfarisation	  of	  the	  state,	  Jayewardene	  set	  
about	  finding	  alternate	  sources	  of	  populist	  legitimacy	  and	  consent.	  This	  happened	  on	  the	  one	  hand	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through	  an	  exaggerated	  performance	  of	  Buddhist	  religiosity,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  through	  a	  series	  of	  
high-­‐profile,	  high-­‐budget	  rural	  development	  schemes.	  	  
	  
Once	  elected	  into	  power	  with	  an	  overwhelming	  legislative	  majority	  in	  1977,	  and	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  
executive	  presidency	  at	  hand,	  Jayewardene’s	  development	  agenda	  was	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  market	  
reforms,	  foreign	  investment	  and	  export-­‐processing	  zones	  that	  it	  is	  known	  for.	  Indeed	  these	  elements	  
were	  often	  overshadowed	  by	  the	  massive	  expansion	  of	  the	  state	  under	  public	  sector	  investment	  
projects	  that	  increased	  the	  state	  employment	  head-­‐count	  by	  20	  percent	  in	  his	  first	  five	  years	  in	  
power.29	  Most	  vivid	  of	  the	  many	  rural	  development	  projects	  of	  the	  time	  was	  the	  revitalization	  the	  
Mahaweli	  development	  project.	  Originally	  conceived	  in	  the	  1960s	  as	  a	  thirty	  year	  project	  of	  
electrification	  and	  irrigation-­‐based	  rural	  development	  covering	  39	  percent	  of	  the	  land-­‐mass	  of	  Sri	  
Lanka,	  the	  project	  was	  under	  Jayewardene	  compressed	  and	  accelerated	  to	  fit	  within	  six	  years,	  in	  
which	  time,	  six	  reservoirs	  and	  five	  hydro-­‐electric	  power	  plants	  were	  to	  be	  built,	  along	  with	  the	  
irrigation	  of	  112,000	  hectares	  of	  land.30	  
	  
The	  reform	  agenda	  continued	  to	  unfold	  under	  Premadasa	  through	  the	  UNP’s	  adroit	  ability	  to	  
camouflage	  its	  business-­‐friendly	  reforms	  under	  the	  thunder	  and	  lightning	  of	  populist	  ethno-­‐religious	  
outreach	  and	  rural	  development	  programmes.	  A	  considerable	  part	  of	  Premadasa’s	  personal	  
attention	  was	  spent	  designing,	  implementing	  and	  communicating	  his	  massive	  public	  housing	  
scheme,31	  the	  new	  Janasaviya	  poverty	  alleviation	  programme,	  the	  two	  hundred	  garment	  factory	  
scheme	  for	  rural	  job	  creation,	  and	  the	  Gam	  Udawa	  village	  development	  ‘awakening’	  schemes.32	  
Unusually	  for	  a	  poor	  South	  Asian	  country	  where	  such	  spending	  is	  frequently	  associated	  with	  
clientelist	  excess,	  the	  wastage	  of	  public	  funds,	  and	  corrupt	  misgovernance,	  the	  brief	  Premadasa	  
period	  is	  nevertheless	  viewed	  in	  retrospect	  as	  relatively	  more	  successful	  in	  its	  stated	  aims.	  Even	  
though	  many	  of	  these	  negative	  elements	  were	  present,	  the	  programmes	  were	  nevertheless	  
imaginative	  and	  innovative	  and	  reflected	  Premadasa’s	  personal	  commitment	  and	  zeal	  towards	  their	  
success.	  	  
	  
Moreover,	  given	  the	  extent	  of	  its	  association	  with	  high	  profile	  religiosity	  and	  poverty	  alleviation,	  it	  is	  
instructive	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Premadasa	  period	  remains	  in	  the	  memory	  of	  corporate	  leaders	  as	  a	  
golden	  age	  of	  government	  responsiveness	  and	  business-­‐friendly	  efficiency.	  This	  was	  the	  point	  at	  
which	  Sri	  Lanka	  most	  closely	  resembled	  an	  authoritarian	  East	  Asian	  developmental	  state.	  It	  was	  
corrupt,	  but	  efficient;	  intolerant	  and	  rough	  with	  critics,	  but	  business-­‐minded	  and	  results-­‐oriented;	  it	  
suppressed	  unions,	  but	  was	  generous	  and	  innovative	  with	  welfare	  schemes.	  It	  featured	  the	  
inscrutable	  and	  demanding	  personality	  of	  Premadasa	  at	  its	  apex,	  ably	  assisted	  by	  a	  phalanx	  of	  hard-­‐
working	  and	  competent	  bureaucrats	  such	  as	  Bradman	  Weerakoon	  and	  R.	  Paskaralingam.	  The	  
government	  managed	  to	  deliver,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  attracting	  foreign	  investments,	  but	  also	  in	  getting	  
garment	  factories	  located	  in	  the	  rural	  hinterland	  where	  they	  provided	  jobs	  and	  incomes	  for	  poor	  
families.	  In	  this	  brief	  period	  of	  1990-­‐93,	  the	  UNP’s	  vision	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  market-­‐driven	  
globalized	  economic	  growth	  and	  poverty	  alleviation	  briefly	  reached	  its	  pinnacle.	  This	  was	  in	  essence,	  
what	  the	  executive	  presidency	  aspired	  to	  do.33	  
	  
The	  other	  important	  feature	  that	  shaped,	  and	  left	  a	  deep	  imprint	  on	  the	  development	  agenda	  in	  that	  
period	  was	  the	  escalating	  civil	  war.	  By	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1980s,	  the	  war	  in	  the	  north	  and	  the	  
brewing	  JVP	  rebellion	  in	  the	  south	  had	  claimed	  a	  growing	  share	  of	  the	  state’s	  resources,	  and	  was	  
imposing	  a	  heavy	  toll	  on	  the	  economy.	  A	  series	  of	  economic	  analyses	  in	  the	  1990s	  began	  to	  attach	  a	  
developmental	  cost	  to	  the	  war,	  estimating	  the	  direct	  costs	  such	  as	  the	  diversion	  of	  scarce	  resources	  
to	  military	  purposes,	  the	  destruction	  of	  physical	  capital,	  and	  the	  interruption	  of	  production	  and	  
trade,	  as	  well	  as	  indirect	  costs	  such	  as	  the	  flight	  of	  human	  capital	  and	  foregone	  foreign	  investment.34	  
As	  a	  result,	  there	  was	  a	  growing	  consensus	  that	  the	  conflict	  had	  come	  to	  pose	  an	  unbearable	  burden	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on	  the	  economy,	  and	  that	  it	  needed	  to	  be	  resolved,	  even	  at	  heavy	  cost	  if	  need	  be,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  
country	  to	  progress.	  
	  
If	  war	  was	  seen	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  development,	  then	  it	  was	  the	  flip-­‐side	  of	  a	  widely	  
held	  view	  that	  development	  was	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  conflict.	  Both	  the	  Tamil	  separatists	  of	  the	  north,	  
and	  the	  Sinhala-­‐Marxist	  insurgents	  of	  the	  Janatha	  Vimukthi	  Peramuna	  (JVP)	  in	  the	  south35	  were	  
widely	  associated	  with	  the	  frustrations	  of	  poorer,	  socially	  disadvantaged	  groups	  in	  those	  
communities.	  It	  led	  consequently,	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  economic	  development	  as	  an	  urgent	  need	  
and	  a	  potential	  alternative	  route	  to	  conflict	  resolution.	  In	  consequence,	  development	  has	  since	  1977	  
frequently	  taken	  on	  the	  implicit	  if	  not	  explicit	  rationale	  of	  addressing	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  unrest	  in	  
youth	  unemployment	  and	  rural	  poverty.	  	  
	  
But	  in	  reality,	  the	  way	  that	  development	  and	  war	  interacted	  was	  far	  more	  complex	  than	  the	  
relatively	  straight-­‐forward	  task	  of	  tallying	  up	  the	  costs	  of	  war,	  or	  in	  the	  causal	  link	  between	  poverty	  
and	  violence.	  Market	  reform	  and	  the	  ethnic	  conflict	  were	  the	  two	  leading	  policy	  items	  on	  the	  agenda	  
of	  the	  UNP	  government	  for	  most	  of	  its	  17	  years	  in	  power,	  and	  these	  two	  items	  were	  deeply	  inter-­‐
connected	  at	  the	  political,	  socio-­‐economic,	  and	  ideological	  level.	  At	  one	  level,	  the	  UNP’s	  exaggerated	  
display	  of	  Buddhist	  religiosity	  and	  Sinhala	  patriotism	  –	  which	  was	  at	  least	  partly	  in	  order	  to	  
compensate	  for	  the	  evident	  unpopularity	  and	  illegitimacy	  of	  the	  market	  reforms	  -­‐	  had	  the	  obvious	  
knock-­‐on	  effect	  of	  further	  alienating	  the	  Tamil	  minority.	  	  
	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  1982	  presidential	  election	  show	  that	  the	  UNP’s	  support	  was	  weakening	  amongst	  
rural	  Sinhala	  Buddhists,	  probably	  as	  Mick	  Moore	  suggests,36	  due	  to	  a	  conjoined	  cultural/economic	  
rejection	  of	  the	  reforms.	  It	  created	  a	  situation	  by	  the	  early-­‐1980s	  where	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  
market	  reform	  agenda	  required	  the	  government	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  was	  defending	  the	  interests	  
of	  the	  Sinhala	  Buddhists,	  even	  if	  it	  meant	  alienating	  the	  Tamils	  and	  painting	  itself	  into	  a	  corner	  on	  
the	  ethnic	  issue.	  Through	  the	  early	  1980s,	  Jayewardene	  was	  forced	  into	  an	  increasingly	  
confrontational	  posture	  on	  the	  ethnic	  conflict	  and	  was	  unable,	  for	  fear	  of	  arousing	  Sinhalese	  
opposition,	  to	  make	  the	  concessions	  that	  would	  pull	  it	  back	  from	  the	  brink.	  In	  effect,	  the	  stability	  of	  
the	  government,	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  its	  market	  reform	  plan	  depended	  indirectly	  on	  its	  refusal	  to	  
pursue	  an	  appropriate	  course	  of	  conflict	  resolution.37	  
	  
	  
PRESIDENTIALISM	  UNDER	  CHALLENGE:	  1994-­‐2005	  
By	  the	  second	  decade	  of	  the	  war	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  presidency	  and	  its	  relationship	  
to	  the	  development	  agenda	  had	  changed	  entirely.	  After	  17	  years,	  the	  UNP	  lost	  power	  in	  1994,	  and	  
with	  that	  came	  an	  end	  to	  the	  unambiguous	  commitment	  to	  market	  reform	  that	  it	  provided.	  In	  its	  
place,	  a	  left-­‐centre	  coalition	  called	  the	  People’s	  Alliance	  (PA)	  came	  to	  power,	  winning	  both	  
parliament	  and	  the	  presidency	  under	  Chandrika	  Kumaratunga.	  The	  PA	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  an	  enlarged	  
version	  of	  the	  left-­‐centre	  United	  Front	  (UF)	  coalition	  that	  was	  in	  power	  from	  1970-­‐77	  under	  
Kumaratunga’s	  mother,	  Mrs	  Sirimavo	  Banadranaike.	  Unlike	  the	  UF	  in	  the	  1970s,	  the	  PA	  was	  not	  
dependent	  on	  legislative	  support	  from	  the	  communists,	  but	  she	  nevertheless	  did	  appoint	  a	  number	  
of	  left	  party	  leaders	  to	  important	  ministerial	  positions	  in	  the	  coalition	  government.	  
	  
Mick	  Moore	  describes	  how	  President	  Kumaratunga	  handled	  the	  challenge	  of	  balancing	  the	  left	  and	  
right	  by	  appointing	  technocrats	  to	  key	  economic	  decision-­‐making	  posts,	  while	  retaining	  party	  
populists	  such	  as	  Mahinda	  Rajapakse	  in	  cabinet	  to	  ensure	  the	  coalition’s	  electoral	  dominance.38	  As	  a	  
result,	  market	  reforms	  and	  economic	  growth	  sputtered	  on	  between	  1995-­‐2001,	  but	  often	  at	  an	  
uneven	  pace.	  Some	  important	  reforms,	  including	  large	  privatisations	  went	  through	  in	  this	  period,	  
but	  they	  happened	  amidst	  prevarication,	  self-­‐doubt,	  and	  internal	  tension	  at	  the	  top.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  
greater	  scepticism	  towards	  market	  reforms	  that	  had	  taken	  hold	  domestically	  and	  internationally	  at	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the	  time,	  Kumaratunga	  promised	  to	  moderate	  the	  reforms	  with	  a	  ‘human	  face’	  and	  demonstrated	  
greater	  personal	  commitment	  and	  energy	  towards	  addressing	  their	  social	  impact.	  In	  substance,	  this	  
took	  the	  form	  of	  scrapping	  Premadasa’s	  trademark	  poverty	  alleviation	  scheme,	  the	  Janasaviya	  
project	  and	  replacing	  it	  with	  a	  new	  one,	  Samurdhi.	  
	  
In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  tumultuous	  and	  violence-­‐scarred	  decade	  of	  the	  1980s,	  Sri	  Lanka	  was	  being	  
transformed	  along	  a	  number	  of	  different	  axes	  at	  very	  different	  rates.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  was	  a	  
striking	  contrast	  between	  the	  ‘normal’	  development	  processes	  in	  the	  south	  and	  the	  abnormal,	  crisis-­‐
ridden	  situation	  of	  humanitarian	  relief	  and	  persistent	  insecurity	  in	  the	  north.	  But	  even	  in	  the	  south,	  
there	  was	  a	  growing	  rift	  between	  the	  prosperity	  of	  globally	  connected,	  urban	  sectors	  of	  the	  
economy	  such	  as	  finance,	  tourism	  or	  garments,	  and	  the	  persistent	  poverty	  of	  the	  small	  paddy	  
farmer.	  Inequality	  grew	  steadily	  since	  the	  late	  1970s,	  but	  at	  a	  particularly	  sharp	  increase	  in	  the	  
1990s-­‐2002	  period,	  as	  high	  rates	  of	  economic	  growth	  were	  matched	  by	  very	  low	  rates	  in	  poverty	  
reduction.39	  Moreover	  this	  growth	  was	  overwhelmingly	  concentrated	  in	  urban	  districts	  such	  that	  the	  
poverty	  headcount	  was	  either	  the	  same	  or	  had	  increased	  in	  9	  of	  17	  districts	  during	  the	  decade	  of	  the	  
1990s	  (excluding	  the	  north-­‐east).	  There	  was	  also	  a	  significant	  sectoral	  imbalance	  in	  the	  growth,	  
which	  came	  largely	  from	  the	  industrial	  and	  service	  sectors,	  whereas	  there	  was	  an	  unusually	  rapid	  
decline	  in	  the	  agricultural	  economy.	  	  
	  
In	  that	  context,	  the	  intersection	  of	  normal	  development	  and	  the	  war	  created	  a	  series	  of	  perverse	  
and	  unusual	  outcomes.	  For	  example,	  by	  the	  late-­‐1990s,	  the	  army	  had	  become	  the	  biggest	  employer	  
in	  the	  country,	  and	  the	  largest	  source	  of	  formal	  sector	  cash	  employment	  for	  young	  Sinhalese	  men	  
from	  rural	  backgrounds,	  particularly	  those	  from	  the	  outer	  rural	  periphery.40	  In	  parallel,	  there	  was	  a	  
steady	  flow	  of	  rural	  women	  seeking	  work	  in	  the	  garment	  factories	  of	  the	  free-­‐trade	  zones	  in	  
Katunayake	  or	  Biyagama,41	  and	  also	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  domestic	  workers.42	  A	  historic	  de-­‐
agrarianization	  of	  the	  workforce	  took	  place	  during	  the	  1990s	  as	  the	  share	  of	  the	  working	  population	  
in	  agriculture,	  which	  had	  remained	  largely	  unchanged	  since	  the	  1950s,	  dropped	  from	  47	  percent	  
down	  to	  32	  percent.	  During	  this	  period,	  when	  commodity	  prices	  for	  crops	  such	  as	  paddy	  were	  in	  
steady	  decline,	  and	  farming	  was	  often	  unremunerative,	  remittances	  from	  migrant	  workers	  and	  
soldiers	  did	  much	  to	  support	  the	  welfare	  of	  rural	  households,	  and	  to	  prop	  up	  the	  village	  economy	  in	  
the	  Sinhala	  south.	  	  
	  
Meanwhile,	  in	  the	  war-­‐torn	  north-­‐east,	  the	  kinds	  of	  transformations	  underway	  were	  entirely	  
different.	  A	  journey	  past	  the	  frontiers	  of	  ‘normal’	  Sri	  Lanka,	  beyond	  Medawachchiya,	  Kantale,	  or	  
Welikanda	  often	  gave	  one	  the	  impression	  of	  arriving	  at	  an	  entirely	  different	  land,	  where	  the	  
developmental	  debates	  on	  fiscal	  reform	  or	  labour	  legislation	  were	  entirely	  irrelevant.	  Large	  parts	  of	  
the	  north-­‐east	  had	  been	  under	  the	  intermittent	  control	  of	  the	  LTTE	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  and	  were	  
mostly	  excluded	  from	  government	  economic	  statistics,	  although	  it	  was	  well	  known	  to	  relief	  agencies	  
and	  public	  servants	  by	  the	  early	  1990s	  that	  the	  people	  of	  the	  north-­‐east	  were	  among	  the	  most	  
deprived,	  vulnerable,	  and	  under-­‐served	  in	  the	  country.43	  	  
	  
This	  also	  meant	  that	  basic	  public	  services	  such	  as	  electricity,	  telephones,	  roads,	  hospitals	  and	  
schools,	  were	  either	  entirely	  lacking	  or	  in	  very	  poor	  repair,	  having	  suffered	  war-­‐damage	  followed	  by	  
extensive	  periods	  of	  stagnation	  and	  under-­‐investment.	  This	  situation	  was	  exacerbated	  in	  the	  decade	  
of	  the	  1990s,	  when	  the	  conflict	  was	  transformed	  from	  a	  low-­‐intensity	  guerrilla	  insurgency	  to	  an	  
increasingly	  frontal	  conventional	  war	  fought	  with	  artillery	  and	  large	  troop	  movements.	  During	  this	  
period,	  wide	  swathes	  of	  land,	  including	  heavily	  populated	  areas	  such	  as	  Jaffna	  city	  itself,	  had	  
changed	  hands,	  displacing	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  people	  who	  remained	  transient	  in	  an	  out	  of	  
relief	  camps	  and	  other	  such	  forms	  of	  temporary	  shelter	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.	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Due	  to	  the	  heavy	  media	  restrictions	  in	  place,	  most	  people	  in	  the	  south	  were	  never	  exposed	  to	  this	  
ongoing	  devastation,	  and	  remained	  largely	  insulated	  from	  it,	  living	  their	  lives	  in	  an	  entirely	  different	  
set	  of	  realities	  and	  challenges.	  Partly	  in	  order	  to	  disturb	  this,	  the	  LTTE	  had	  during	  the	  1996-­‐2001	  
period,	  changed	  tactics	  to	  inflict	  a	  direct	  and	  vivid	  economic	  impact	  on	  the	  country’s	  prosperous	  
economic	  nerve-­‐centre.	  The	  January	  1996	  bombing	  of	  the	  Central	  Bank,	  the	  October	  1997	  bombing	  
at	  the	  Galadari	  Hotel,	  and	  the	  July	  2001	  attack	  on	  Katunayake	  airport	  all	  had	  a	  serious	  impact	  on	  the	  
segments	  of	  the	  new,	  post-­‐liberalisation	  economy	  that	  had	  thus	  far	  avoided	  getting	  directly	  
entangled	  in	  the	  war.	  One	  consequence	  of	  this	  was	  that	  corporate	  leaders,	  who	  had	  hitherto	  been	  
quietly	  sympathetic	  of	  the	  Kumaratunga	  government,	  became	  frustrated	  and	  eventually	  tired	  of	  her	  
strategy	  of	  ‘war	  for	  peace’,	  and	  lobbied	  instead	  for	  a	  negotiated	  end	  to	  the	  war,	  even	  if	  that	  
ultimately	  meant	  sharing	  power	  with	  the	  LTTE.	  
	   	  
During	  Kumaratunga’s	  second	  term	  (2000-­‐2005),	  the	  executive	  presidency	  entered	  into	  an	  acute	  and	  
unprecedented	  crisis,	  with	  its	  powers	  significantly	  weakened.	  The	  overlapping	  political,	  military,	  and	  
economic	  quagmire	  that	  the	  Kumaratunga	  government	  found	  itself	  in	  during	  2000-­‐2001	  led	  first	  to	  a	  
difficult	  and	  short-­‐lived	  coalition,	  and	  then	  to	  a	  complete	  loss	  of	  the	  legislature	  in	  December	  2001.	  
Following	  a	  rare	  election	  victory	  for	  the	  UNP	  in	  mid-­‐term	  parliamentary	  elections,	  Sri	  Lanka	  faced	  
the	  unusual	  situation	  of	  a	  hostile	  relationship	  between	  president	  and	  parliament.	  Under	  this	  ‘co-­‐
habitation’	  period	  that	  ensued	  between	  December	  2001-­‐April	  2004,	  the	  executive	  presidency	  was	  
reduced	  to	  the	  position	  of	  a	  Westminster-­‐style	  figurehead	  while	  Ranil	  Wickremasinghe	  as	  prime	  
minister	  took	  firm	  control	  of	  the	  executive	  and	  formed	  a	  government.	  
	  
Aware	  of	  the	  ticking	  political	  clock	  against	  him,	  and	  of	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  co-­‐habitation	  
arrangement,	  Wickremasinghe	  was	  eager	  to	  achieve	  quick	  successes	  that	  he	  could	  have	  available	  to	  
present	  to	  the	  public	  in	  time	  to	  contest	  himself	  for	  the	  upcoming	  presidential	  elections	  of	  2005.	  As	  a	  
result,	  the	  new	  government	  rushed	  through	  a	  series	  of	  far-­‐reaching	  initiatives	  on	  the	  two	  most	  
controversial	  and	  long-­‐standing	  items	  of	  state	  reform,	  the	  ethnic	  conflict	  and	  market	  liberalisation	  -­‐	  
often	  in	  a	  brazen	  and	  demonstrative	  disregard	  for	  the	  president.	  Within	  weeks	  of	  coming	  to	  power,	  
the	  new	  government	  signed	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  with	  the	  LTTE,	  and	  followed	  it	  up	  with	  direct	  negotiations.	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  also	  secured	  an	  unprecedented	  amount	  of	  foreign	  aid	  and	  pushed	  through	  a	  
highly	  ambitious	  legislative	  agenda	  of	  market	  reforms.	  	  
	  
But	  co-­‐habitation	  ultimately	  proved	  unworkable:	  Wickremasinghe’s	  government	  was	  destabilised	  
and	  toppled	  in	  a	  constitutional	  coup	  by	  the	  president	  after	  barely	  two	  years	  in	  power.	  When	  its	  
popularity	  was	  tested	  in	  mid-­‐term	  elections	  in	  April	  2004,	  the	  UNP	  lost	  its	  majority	  and	  suffered	  a	  
huge	  backlash	  against	  the	  economic	  and	  ethnic	  elements	  of	  its	  agenda.	  Despite	  the	  massive	  
international	  support	  and	  funding	  from	  the	  western	  donors	  for	  his	  government,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  
because	  of	  it,	  Wickremasinghe	  found	  himself	  wanting	  in	  domestic	  support,	  particularly	  from	  the	  core	  
Sinhala-­‐Buddhist	  demographic.	  	  
	  
Some	  elements	  of	  the	  UNP’s	  market	  reform	  and	  fiscal	  austerity	  programme	  were	  particularly	  
unpopular,	  such	  as	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  fertilizer	  subsidy,	  and	  a	  public	  sector	  hiring	  freeze.	  But	  
perhaps	  more	  substantial	  than	  these	  individual	  budgetary	  line	  items	  was	  the	  larger	  strategic	  failure	  
of	  statecraft.	  Wickremasinghe,	  unlike	  Jayewardene	  or	  Premadasa,	  made	  the	  mistake	  of	  presenting	  
his	  core	  agenda	  in	  its	  naked,	  technocratic,	  counter-­‐populist	  core,	  without	  any	  alternative	  avenue	  of	  
legitimacy	  or	  patronage	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  disguise	  it	  or	  buy-­‐off	  opponents.	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  
rendered	  his	  agenda	  vulnerable	  to	  attack	  from	  a	  two-­‐pronged	  charge	  that	  it	  was	  against	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  Sinhalese	  majority,	  and	  that	  it	  would	  damage	  the	  economic	  welfare	  of	  the	  poor	  and	  
vulnerable	  at	  large.44	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There	  are	  two	  important	  conclusions	  on	  the	  executive	  presidency	  and	  market	  reform	  that	  emerge	  
and	  are	  reinforced	  by	  the	  events	  of	  2001-­‐2004.	  Firstly,	  even	  under	  Sri	  Lanka’s	  constitution,	  which	  is	  
balanced	  heavily	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  president,	  the	  executive	  power	  of	  the	  presidency	  still	  depends	  
heavily	  on	  control	  of	  the	  legislature,	  without	  which	  the	  president	  can	  be	  reduced	  either	  to	  an	  
ornamental	  role,	  or	  at	  best	  to	  a	  constitutionally	  empowered	  obstructionist.	  Secondly,	  there	  remain	  
very	  deep	  currents	  of	  popular	  opposition	  to	  the	  market	  reform	  process	  in	  the	  electorate,	  and	  this	  
can	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  as	  in	  April	  2004,	  become	  a	  systemic	  factor	  that	  sways	  the	  outcome	  
of	  parliamentary	  elections.	  Beyond	  the	  growing	  disenchantment	  with	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  the	  
south,	  fuelled	  to	  no	  small	  degree	  by	  the	  LTTE’s	  provocative	  ceasefire	  violations,	  the	  Ranil	  
Wickremasinghe	  government’s	  breakneck	  pace	  of	  market	  reform	  in	  2002-­‐2003	  became	  a	  significant	  
element	  in	  catalysing	  the	  opposition	  movement	  that	  ultimately	  unseated	  it.	  Moreover,	  it	  led	  the	  
subsequent	  UPFA	  government,	  which	  was	  now	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  coalition	  support	  from	  the	  JVP,	  
to	  halt	  the	  economic	  reforms	  entirely	  and	  to	  adopt	  a	  pronounced	  anti-­‐reform	  posture.	  	  
	  
	  
THE	  POPULIST	  PRESIDENCY:	  2005-­‐	  
To	  recapitulate	  the	  argument	  thus	  far:	  after	  reaching	  its	  high	  water	  mark	  under	  Premadasa	  in	  the	  
early	  1990s,	  the	  executive	  presidency	  and	  the	  market	  reform	  programme	  slipped	  slowly	  into	  crisis	  
over	  the	  next	  decade.	  Kumaratunga’s	  early	  promise	  to	  abolish	  the	  presidency,	  and	  to	  moderate	  the	  
reforms	  with	  a	  human	  face	  had	  led	  to	  a	  period	  of	  flux	  and	  ambiguity,	  ending	  eventually	  in	  the	  
disintegration	  of	  the	  reform	  agenda	  and	  the	  dramatic	  weakening	  of	  the	  presidency.	  As	  an	  institution	  
that	  is	  electorally	  more	  connected	  to	  the	  popular	  pulse,	  parliament	  had	  in	  the	  Kumaratunga	  period,	  
become	  the	  vehicle	  through	  which	  mass	  politics	  returned	  to	  challenge	  the	  largely	  elite-­‐driven	  
projects	  of	  state	  reform	  (on	  the	  economy	  and	  ethnic	  relations)	  that	  the	  executive	  presidency	  had	  
been	  empowered	  to	  push	  through.	  The	  relationship	  between	  president	  and	  parliament	  had	  swung	  
decisively	  in	  favour	  of	  parliament	  in	  this	  period,	  and	  the	  project	  of	  the	  executive	  presidency	  
envisioned	  by	  Jayewardene	  lay	  in	  disarray.	  
	  
Faced	  with	  this	  crisis,	  the	  Rajapakse	  presidency’s	  historic	  challenge	  was	  to	  reverse	  that	  equation,	  
and	  to	  reassert	  the	  power	  of	  the	  presidency.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  he	  effectively	  had	  to	  gain	  command	  
of	  a	  pliant	  parliamentary	  majority.	  This	  was	  accomplished	  over	  2006-­‐08	  through	  a	  complicated	  game	  
of	  carrots	  and	  sticks	  to	  win	  small	  parties	  over	  to	  his	  coalition,	  and	  to	  entice	  defections	  from	  the	  
opposition.	  The	  most	  important	  such	  ‘carrot’	  that	  Rajapakse	  wielded	  in	  this	  regard	  was	  his	  ability	  to	  
generate	  ministerships,	  and	  indeed,	  there	  was	  an	  unprecedented	  expansion	  in	  the	  number	  of	  
ministers	  and	  ministries	  in	  this	  period.	  Beyond	  this,	  Rajapakse	  also	  wrought	  a	  more	  substantial	  ideo-­‐
political	  shift	  by	  wresting	  the	  mantle	  of	  counter-­‐elite	  popular	  mobilisation	  away	  from	  parliament.	  In	  
doing	  so,	  he	  turned	  what	  were	  the	  presidency’s	  weaknesses	  into	  his	  strengths,	  and	  what	  were	  
traditionally	  the	  means	  of	  achieving	  state	  reform,	  into	  the	  ends	  in	  itself.	  	  
	  
Rajapakse’s	  first	  term	  was	  dominated	  by	  the	  last	  phase	  of	  the	  civil	  war,	  and	  by	  his	  quest	  for	  a	  stable	  
legislative	  majority:	  and	  he	  was	  fortunate	  on	  both	  counts.	  A	  steady	  drum-­‐beat	  of	  military	  victories	  
against	  separatist	  rebels	  in	  the	  north-­‐east	  did	  much	  to	  buttress	  his	  personal	  popularity	  with	  the	  core	  
Sinhalese	  electorate,	  and	  this	  assisted	  in	  his	  campaign	  to	  divide	  and	  conquer	  parliament.	  In	  his	  first	  
two	  years	  in	  power,	  Rajapakse	  managed	  to	  end	  his	  parliamentary	  dependence	  on	  the	  mercurial	  JVP	  
and	  its	  contingent	  of	  37	  coalition	  MPs	  by	  winning	  over	  a	  large	  section	  of	  the	  other	  large	  opposition	  
party,	  the	  UNP,	  including	  several	  of	  its	  senior	  leaders.	  Then,	  in	  a	  political	  master-­‐stroke,	  he	  managed	  
to	  split	  the	  JVP	  itself	  in	  April	  2008,	  winning	  away	  its	  leading	  demagogue	  Wimal	  Weerawamsa	  to	  his	  
side.	  Despite	  a	  brewing	  economic	  crisis	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  inflation	  that	  increased	  trade	  union	  
pressure,	  Rajapakse’s	  public	  image	  in	  the	  south	  continued	  to	  soar	  during	  the	  war,	  with	  the	  crushing	  
military	  defeat	  of	  the	  LTTE	  in	  May	  2009	  translating	  into	  a	  resounding	  electoral	  victory	  at	  the	  
presidential	  and	  parliamentary	  elections	  of	  2010.	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Having	  thus	  successfully	  reasserted	  the	  power	  of	  the	  presidency	  in	  his	  first	  term,	  Rajapakse	  had	  in	  
his	  second	  term	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  turned	  its	  energies	  towards	  an	  economic	  revival	  under	  a	  
nationalist	  oriented	  vision	  of	  developmentalism.	  The	  2010	  election	  manifesto,	  Mahinda	  Chintana:	  
Vision	  for	  the	  Future	  made	  a	  specific	  commitment	  to	  doubling	  per	  capita	  income	  and	  an	  eight	  
percent	  annual	  economic	  growth	  rate.	  In	  the	  meanwhile,	  Rajapakse	  not	  only	  maintained	  a	  safe	  
rhetorical	  distance	  from	  any	  market	  reforms,	  but	  his	  manifesto	  declared	  the	  era	  of	  market	  reforms	  
to	  have	  ended,	  such	  that	  the	  Rajapakse	  presidency	  since	  then	  represented	  a	  new	  post-­‐market	  
reform	  period.	  Indeed	  most	  reforms	  were	  suspended	  between	  2005-­‐14.	  In	  reality,	  the	  policy	  record	  
of	  the	  Rajapakse	  period	  has	  one	  of	  freezing	  reforms	  in	  place,	  and	  treading	  water	  rather	  launching	  
any	  sustained	  campaign	  of	  rolling	  back	  the	  market	  reforms,	  but	  there	  had	  been	  a	  minor	  re-­‐
nationalisation	  (Sri	  Lankan	  Airlines),	  and	  the	  launch	  of	  a	  new	  public	  sector	  airline	  (Mihin	  Lanka).	  
	  
In	  place	  of	  the	  market	  reforms,	  and	  its	  association	  with	  a	  western-­‐oriented	  comprador	  capitalism,	  
the	  post-­‐war	  developmental	  regime	  under	  Rajapakse	  had	  a	  distinctly	  nationalist	  and	  non-­‐western	  
orientation	  with	  three	  key	  features.	  Firstly	  it	  signified	  the	  reversion	  to	  ‘hardware’	  over	  ‘software’.	  
That	  is,	  the	  government	  has	  prioritised	  the	  construction	  of	  airports,	  ports,	  expressways,	  and	  other	  
such	  monuments	  of	  economic	  infrastructure,	  with	  the	  clear	  aim	  of	  bringing	  the	  island’s	  ageing	  
hardware	  up	  to	  date,	  and	  catching	  up	  for	  the	  time	  lost	  during	  the	  war.	  It	  was	  in	  essence	  a	  reversion	  
to	  an	  older,	  grander	  developmental	  vision	  that	  held	  sway	  internationally	  during	  the	  1950s	  and	  
1960s,	  and	  that	  due	  to	  its	  scale	  and	  scope,	  necessarily	  places	  the	  state	  back	  in	  a	  more	  commanding	  
position.	  In	  contrast,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  conscious	  de-­‐prioritisation,	  and	  even	  a	  hostility	  for	  ‘software’:	  
the	  kind	  of	  smaller,	  village-­‐level	  projects	  of	  poverty	  alleviation	  and	  empowerment	  frequently	  
implemented	  by	  NGOs	  rather	  than	  states,	  that	  had	  gained	  greater	  prominence	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
Mahaweli	  project	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  it	  signified	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  western	  aid	  donors	  to	  non-­‐western	  donors,	  particularly	  
China.	  Most	  of	  the	  western	  donor	  countries	  who	  had	  been	  closely	  involved	  in	  the	  2002-­‐2005	  peace	  
process,	  became	  very	  critical	  of	  the	  Rajapakse	  government.	  The	  government	  in	  turn	  viewed	  western-­‐
funded	  aid	  projects,	  particularly	  those	  in	  the	  north-­‐east,	  with	  suspicion	  as	  nodes	  of	  subversion,	  and	  
subjected	  them	  to	  an	  increasing	  burden	  of	  surveillance	  and	  control.	  In	  their	  place,	  China	  emerged	  as	  
Rajapakse’s	  preferred	  development	  partner,	  financier	  and	  implementer,	  with	  Chinese	  public	  sector	  
firms	  constructing	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  and	  high	  profile	  projects	  of	  this	  period,	  such	  as	  the	  
Hambantota	  port	  and	  the	  Katunayake	  expressway.	  	  
	  
Thirdly,	  it	  signified	  an	  approach	  to	  post-­‐war	  transformation	  in	  which	  economic	  development	  was	  
promoted	  in	  lieu	  of	  a	  political	  solution	  to	  the	  ethnic	  conflict.	  The	  Rajapakse	  government	  had	  from	  
the	  very	  beginning,	  been	  sceptical	  of	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  an	  ethnic	  conflict	  with	  genuine	  underlying	  
grievances.	  Instead	  they	  had	  preferred	  to	  view	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  terrorist	  threat	  fuelled	  by	  regional	  
under-­‐development.	  As	  a	  result,	  and	  also	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  its	  popularity	  with	  the	  Sinhalese	  
electorate,	  Rajapakse	  was	  resistant	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  recognising,	  engaging	  with,	  or	  addressing	  Tamil	  
grievances	  through	  state	  reforms	  and	  through	  any	  process	  of	  accountability.	  Instead,	  his	  
government	  sought	  to	  accelerate	  economic	  and	  infrastructure	  development	  in	  the	  north-­‐east,	  and	  
to	  use	  this	  as	  a	  political	  weapon	  to	  win	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Tamils,	  and	  to	  undermine	  the	  appeal	  of	  
ethnic	  Tamil	  politics.	  
	  
What	  then,	  in	  summary,	  has	  been	  the	  impact	  of	  Mahinda	  Rajapakse	  on	  the	  weakened,	  crisis-­‐ridden	  
presidency	  that	  he	  inherited?	  The	  answer	  in	  brief,	  is	  that	  the	  presidency	  was	  rescued,	  but	  in	  doing	  
so,	  its	  rationale	  and	  logic	  was	  inverted.	  That	  is,	  whereas	  the	  presidency	  was	  initially	  designed	  to	  
shield	  the	  executive	  from	  the	  heat	  of	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  electoral	  vulnerability,	  and	  from	  the	  ethnic	  
nationalist	  and	  welfarist	  economic	  pressures,	  Rajapakse	  has	  instead	  embraced	  and	  championed	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both	  of	  those	  tendencies.	  The	  three	  previous	  executive	  presidents:	  Jayewardene,	  Premadasa,	  and	  
Kumaratunga	  had	  often	  been	  charged	  with	  conceding	  to	  economic	  populism,	  and	  pandering	  to	  
ethnic	  chauvinism,	  the	  implication	  being	  that	  these	  were	  necessary	  tactical	  evils	  of	  the	  political	  
game	  that	  they	  were	  forced	  to	  endure	  and	  perform	  for	  reasons	  of	  expediency,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  
against	  their	  own	  better	  judgment.	  Politics	  was	  in	  this	  sense,	  understood	  by	  its	  protagonists	  to	  be	  a	  
game	  in	  which	  elites	  used	  bread	  and	  circuses	  to	  distract	  the	  masses	  in	  order	  to	  get	  on	  with	  the	  
business	  of	  government	  undisturbed.	  	  
	  
Rajapakse	  instead,	  championed	  an	  agenda	  of	  cultivating	  mass	  popularity	  and	  immersing	  himself	  in	  
mass	  politics	  in	  a	  far	  more	  transparent	  way	  without	  it	  being	  used	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  any	  hidden	  elite-­‐
driven	  agenda.	  Opposition	  to	  market	  reforms,	  and	  the	  cultivation	  of	  Sinhala	  nationalism	  was	  under	  
Rajapakse	  not	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end,	  a	  tiger	  to	  be	  ridden,	  or	  a	  fig	  leaf	  to	  lend	  legitimacy	  to	  some	  
unpopular	  counter-­‐populist	  agenda	  of	  state	  reform.	  Instead,	  it	  became	  the	  end-­‐game	  and	  the	  
agenda	  in	  itself.	  The	  rationale	  for	  the	  presidency	  has	  in	  that	  sense	  had	  to	  be	  sacrificed	  in	  order	  for	  




This	  paper	  has	  charted	  the	  developmental	  causes	  and	  consequences	  of	  Sri	  Lanka’s	  executive	  
presidency.	  Rather	  than	  trying	  to	  define	  the	  problem	  as	  a	  causal	  relationship	  in	  itself,	  the	  approach	  
here	  has	  been	  to	  broaden	  the	  parameters	  of	  study,	  and	  to	  understand	  institutional	  change	  and	  
economic	  transformation	  as	  a	  historically	  situated	  political	  project.	  	  
	  
Sri	  Lanka’s	  executive	  presidency	  emerged	  from	  a	  distinct	  rationale	  to	  transform	  what	  its	  framers	  
viewed	  as	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  electoral	  democracy	  on	  economic	  development	  and	  on	  policy	  
formulation	  more	  broadly.	  The	  ambition	  behind	  the	  project	  was	  to	  forge	  a	  powerful	  centralised	  
political	  structure	  that	  could	  push	  through	  market	  reform	  policies	  that	  were	  otherwise	  electorally	  
unfeasible.	  The	  context	  within	  which	  the	  executive	  presidency	  is	  explained	  in	  this	  narrative	  is	  the	  
broader	  terrain	  of	  democracy,	  the	  enduring	  elite/mass	  divide,	  and	  the	  way	  that	  this	  divide	  was	  
articulated	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  opposing	  positions	  that	  each	  side	  took	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  dominant	  
issues	  of	  political	  contention.	  
	  
In	  practice,	  the	  quest	  to	  tame	  electoral	  populism	  and	  establish	  an	  elevated,	  empowered	  presidency	  
in	  the	  service	  of	  an	  unpopular	  economic	  strategy	  was	  intensely	  complicated,	  not	  least	  because	  of	  its	  
overlap	  with	  the	  ethnic	  conflict.	  It	  worked	  best	  in	  its	  early	  years	  when	  the	  agenda	  benefited	  from	  
three	  overlapping	  factors.	  Firstly,	  it	  had	  the	  strong	  personal	  commitment	  of	  the	  president	  to	  market	  
reforms.	  Secondly,	  the	  president	  had	  to	  command	  the	  support	  of	  a	  dependable,	  loyal	  legislature.	  
Thirdly,	  the	  president	  had	  to	  deploy	  a	  sophisticated	  array	  of	  countervailing	  sources	  of	  popular	  
legitimacy	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  a	  backlash	  to	  the	  reforms.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  these	  factors,	  opposition	  to	  the	  elite-­‐led	  projects	  of	  economic	  and	  ethnic	  state	  
reform	  gained	  strength	  during	  the	  Kumaratunga	  period	  and	  coalesced	  within	  parliament.	  As	  
Kumaratunga	  struggled	  to	  control	  a	  rebellious	  parliament	  for	  most	  of	  her	  second	  term,	  the	  executive	  
presidency	  slipped	  into	  crisis	  and	  frequently	  appeared	  weak	  and	  powerless.	  This	  situation	  was	  
eventually	  reversed	  under	  Mahinda	  Rajapakse	  during	  2005-­‐14,	  but	  only	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  abandoning	  
the	  market	  reform	  agenda	  altogether	  –	  and	  thus	  inverting	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  presidency.	  	  
	  
What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  Sri	  Lanka’s	  executive	  presidency	  has	  failed	  
under	  its	  own	  terms.	  The	  attempt	  to	  institutionally	  recalibrate	  the	  elite/mass	  power	  relationship	  (in	  
favour	  of	  elites)	  and	  to	  use	  this	  as	  a	  means	  to	  resolve	  Sri	  Lanka’s	  deepening	  economic	  and	  ethnic	  
crises	  worked	  as	  envisaged	  only	  very	  briefly,	  and	  was	  within	  three	  decades,	  subverted	  and	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neutralised.	  This	  failure	  of	  top-­‐down	  institutional	  reform	  has	  a	  family	  resemblance	  to	  the	  critique	  of	  
the	  good	  governance	  debate	  in	  international	  development.	  ‘Best	  practice’	  institutions	  imposed	  from	  
the	  outside	  are	  frequently	  found	  to	  be	  unworkable	  if	  they	  do	  not	  resonate	  with	  the	  context,	  its	  
particular	  developmental	  gaps,	  the	  extant	  set	  of	  incentives,	  and	  the	  informal	  norms	  of	  behaviour	  
that	  people	  follow.45	  	  But	  Sri	  Lanka’s	  executive	  presidency	  and	  the	  market	  reform	  agenda	  that	  it	  
brought	  forth	  were	  not	  external	  impositions	  or	  naïve	  attempts	  at	  ‘cookie-­‐cutter’	  governance	  reform	  
by	  outsiders.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  presidency	  was	  created	  by	  a	  seasoned	  and	  politically	  shrewd	  
statesman	  who	  micro-­‐engineered	  it	  carefully	  to	  suit	  the	  local	  context.	  	  
	  
What	  this	  speaks	  to	  thus	  is	  perhaps	  more	  of	  relevance	  to	  local,	  internal	  dynamics	  than	  to	  the	  
outside.	  Firstly,	  it	  speaks	  to	  the	  depth	  and	  strength	  of	  the	  two	  agenda	  items:	  economic	  welfarism	  
and	  Sinhala	  nationalism	  as	  central	  axes	  and	  impulses	  of	  Sri	  Lanka’s	  political	  sociology.	  Secondly,	  it	  
suggests	  that	  elites	  are	  weaker	  actors	  than	  is	  widely	  assumed	  and	  that	  their	  position	  is	  far	  more	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